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URING the Survey period the Texas appellate courts handed down
numerous decisions construing various rules of evidence. The cases
of greatest significance arose in the following substantive areas:
(1) Article I--General Provisions; (2) Article II-Judicial Notice; (3) Bur-
den of Proof, Presumptions, and Inferences; (4) Article IV-Relevancy and
Its Limits; (5) Article V-Privileges; (6) Article VI-Witnesses; (7) Article
VII-Opinions and Expert Testimony; (8) Article VIII-Hearsay; (9) Arti-
cle IX-Authentication and Identification; (10) Article X-Contents of
Writings, Recordings and Photographs; and (11) Parol Evidence.
I. ARTICLE I-GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article I of the Texas Rules of Evidence contains many important sub-
stantive provisions. Texas Rule of Evidence 103(a)(1) provides that a timely
objection or motion to strike must appear in the record as a condition for an
appellate attack on an evidentiary ruling.1 The objection must state the spe-
cific ground of objection, if that ground is not apparent from the context. 2
This rule changes prior Texas practice. 3 In Crider v. Appelt # an objection to
testimony that the defendant was never criminally prosecuted for driving
while intoxicated was not preserved for appeal because the record failed to
disclose the grounds for the objection. 5
When evidence admissible for one purpose or as to one party is not admis-
sible for another purpose or as to another party, "the court, upon request,
shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accord-
ingly .... ",6 In State v. Buckner Construction Co.7 the Houston court of
appeals wrote that the state engineer's entire file for a bridge painting project
was properly excluded because the state had failed to sustain its burden of
separating the inadmissible parts of the file from the admissible parts.8 The
court explained that because appellee objected to the entire file on the
ground that it contained inadmissible matters, it became the state's burden
* J.D., University of Texas. Partner, Fulbright & Jaworski, Houston, Texas.
1. TEX. R. EvID. 103(a)(1).
2. Id.
3. Unobjected to hearsay is no longer denied probative value. Id. 802.
4. 696 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no writ).
5. Id. at 57.
6. TEX. R. EVID. 105.
7. 704 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
8. Id. at 847.
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to separate the inadmissible parts from the admissible parts, and offer just
those admissible parts. 9
II. ARTICLE II-JUDICIAL NOTICE
Article II of the Texas Rules of Evidence governs judicial notice. 10 Sev-
eral courts during the Survey period held taking judicial notice of statistical
facts proper under Texas Rule of Evidence 201. The Fort Worth court of
appeals held that the discount rates on ninety-day commercial paper in effect
at a federal reserve bank, which were reported in Federal Reserve bulletins,
were a proper subject for judicial notice when determining whether contrac-
tual interest was usurious.II Another court found that the population of a
county was a proper subject for judicial notice for purposes of determining
the extrajudicial authority of a city within a county. 12
Several courts have upheld the taking of judicial notice of papers on file in
a case. 13 When considering the question of attorney's fees in an action for
specific performance of a contract, an appellate court permitted the trial
court to take judicial notice of the entire case file, including a demand letter
not introduced into evidence but attached to the amended petition. 14
Although a court may take judicial notice of its own file, two courts have
held that a trial judge cannot consider testimony introduced at a previous
trial unless such testimony was admitted into evidence.' 5 In State v. Sun
Growth VI, California Ltd. 16 the Austin court of appeals held that an appel-
late court may judicially notice facts even though the trial court was not
requested to do so.' 7 This notice is proper under Texas Rule of Evidence
201(f), which provides that judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the
proceeding. 18
Texas Rule of Evidence 203 governs the determination of the laws of for-
eign countries. Rule 203 requires that a party who intends to raise an issue
9. Id.
10. TEX. R. EVID. art. II.
11. Wagner & Brown v. E.W. Moran Drilling Co., 702 S.W.2d 760, 773 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1986, no writ). TEX. R. EvID. 201(b) is a verbatim adoption of FED. R. EvID. 201(b).
During the Survey period the Fifth Circuit held that a district court may properly take judicial
notice of prevailing interest rates. Transorient Navigators Co., S.A. v. M/S Southwind, 788
F.2d 288, 293 (5th Cir. 1986).
12. Projects Am. Corp. v. Hilliard, 711 S.W.2d 386, 388 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1986, no
writ).
13. See, e.g., Victory v. State, 138 Tex. 285, 288, 158 S.W.2d 760, 763 (1942) (Texas
courts may take judicial notice of their own records); Klein v. Dimock, 705 S.W.2d 408, 410-
11 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ) (trial judge could take judicial notice of the papers
on file in the case, and therefore had sufficient evidence to determine appellant's application to
set aside probate filed beyond the statute of limitations); Texas Sec. Corp. v. Peters, 463
S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex. Civ. App.-Forth Worth 1971, no writ) (trial judge can take judicial
notice of records of his court and of facts shown by court records of the case on trial).
14. Carrington v. Hart, 703 S.W.2d 814, 818 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, no writ).
15. Traweek v. Larkin, 708 S.W.2d 942, 946-47 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1986, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Muller v. Leyendecker, 697 S.W.2d 668, 675 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
16. 713 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, no writ).
17. Id. at 178.
18. TEX. R. EVID. 201(f).
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concerning the law of a foreign country should give notice in its pleadings or
other reasonable written notice, and at least thirty days prior to the date of
trial furnish all parties copies of any written materials or sources that he
intends to use as proof of the foreign law. 19 In Ossorio v. Leon 20 the appel-
lant introduced proof of Mexican law after the pleadings had been filed. The
San Antonio court of appeals held that the appellant complied with Rule of
Evidence 203 because the trial court allowed her leave to file the documents
and granted her a postponement in order to comply with the rule's
requirements. 21
Administrative rules and regulations are also proper subjects for judicial
notice.22 During the Survey period, one court upheld the propriety of judi-
cially noticing Tax Board guidelines in a case challenging an appraisal made
to determine ad valorem taxes. 23 Texas Rule of Evidence 204 permits the
taking of judicial notice of the contents of the Texas Register.24 The Dallas
court of appeals found that it was proper in a medical malpractice suit to
notice judicially treatments and procedures established by the Texas Medical
Disclosure panel and published in the Texas Register.25
During the Survey period, courts found various topics improper for judi-
cial notice. Such topics included the degrees of illness, disease, or impair-
ment, probable effects of treatment, or likelihood of recovery. 26 In addition,
in a divorce action, a court found the subject matter involved in the former
husband's cause of action against his employer was not proper for judicial
notice when determining whether proceeds from that lawsuit were divided
by the divorce decree.27
III. BURDEN OF PROOF, PRESUMPTIONS, AND INFERENCES
Article III of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs presumptions.28 Be-
cause the Texas Rules of Evidence contain no corresponding article III, the
law of presumptions continues to be governed by Texas common law.
In Jackson v. Green 29 the Corpus Christi court of appeals explained that
the plaintiff does not always have the burden of proof.30 Texas common law
recognizes that courts should place the burden on the party having peculiar
knowledge of the facts to be proved.3 ' As a result, in an action by the wife to
19. Id. 203.
20. 705 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
21. Id. at 222.
22. TEX. R. EvID. 204.
23. Bower v. Edwards County Appraisal Dist., 697 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1985, no writ).
24. TEX. R. EvID. 204.
25. Price v. Hurt, 711 S.W.2d 84, 88 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
26. Carter v. Service Life & Casualty Insur. Co., 703 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1985, no writ).
27. Boaz v. Boaz, 708 S.W.2d 901, 904-05 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ
dism'd).
28. FED. R. EvID. art. III.
29. 700 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
30. Id. at 621.
31. Id. at 622.
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partition the husband's military nondisability retirement benefits not previ-
ously apportioned by the divorce decree, the Corpus Christi court put the
burden on the former husband to establish his rank and the value of his
military retirement benefits at the time of divorce. 32
Presumptions and inferences are sometimes merely assumptions of facts
that have not been rebutted. 33 During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme
Court wrote that an action of the Texas Employment Commission carries a
presumption of validity, so that the party seeking to set aside the agency's
decision has the burden of showing that the decision was not supported by
substantial evidence. 34 A bailor makes a presumptive case of negligence
when he proves that he gave goods to a bailee and that the goods were either
not returned or were returned in a damaged condition.35 Texas has an ex-
ception to this rule: when the goods are shown to have been damaged by
fire, there is not a presumption of negligence against the bailee, and the bur-
den of showing negligence is on the bailor. 36 In Mayhar v. Triana37 the
Eastland court of appeals rejected this fire exception to the general rule and
wrote that the exception should no longer be followed in Texas.38 The Texas
Supreme Court refused the bailee's application for writ of error with the
notation "refused." 39
In P. T & E. Co. v. Beasley4° the Beaumont court of appeals wrote that a
strong presumption exists that a deceased exercised ordinary care for his
own safety. The burden in this case was upon defendants to overcome that
presumption by presenting competent evidence in such a conclusive manner
that reasonable minds could not differ with respect to issues of contributory
negligence. 41
A trial court can make inferences against a party about the circumstances
of a collision based partially on that party's failure to call an important wit-
ness. 42 During the Survey period, the Fifth Circuit wrote that a district
court did not err by refusing to make such an adverse inference from a vessel
owner's failure to call as a witness the vessel's port pilot.43 Neither court
considered the absent pilot's testimony important because the other vessel
owner did not point to any still-disputed fact that the pilot's testimony could
32. Id. at 621-22.
33. See generally 1 R. RAY, TEXAS PRACTICE, LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 51-56 (3d ed.
1980).
34. Mercer v. Ross, 701 S.W.2d 830, 831 (Tex. 1986).
35. Buchanan v. Byrd, 519 S.W.2d 841, 843 (Tex. 1975).
36. Lufkin Indus., Inc. v. Mission Chevrolet, Inc., 614 S.W.2d 596, 598 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Waco 1981, no writ).
37. 701 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1985, writ ref'd).
38. Id. at 327.
39. 29 Tex. S. Ct. J. 314 (Apr. 12, 1986).
40. 698 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
41. Id. at 194.
42. Barrois Bros. v. Lake Tankers Corp., 188 F. Supp. 300, 303 (E. D. La. 1960), aff'd
sub nom. National Marine Serv., Inc. v. Barrois Bros., 286 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1961).
43. United Overseas Export Lines, Inc. v. Medluck Compania Maviera, S.A., 785 F.2d




The Fifth Circuit also considered the operation of rebuttable presump-
tions in Pennzoil Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.45 The Fifth
Circuit wrote that it followed the "Thayer" or "bursting bubble" theory of
presumptions. 46 According to these theories, the only effect of a presump-
tion is to shift the burden of producing evidence with regard to the presumed
fact.47 If the party against whom the presumption operates produces evi-
dence challenging the presumed fact, the presumption simply disappears,
leaving a factual issue to be determined by the trier of fact.48
A rebuttable presumption exists that a properly addressed and stamped
letter will be delivered in the due course of the mails.49 In Gulf Insurance
Co. v. Cherry50 an insurance company had to rebut the presumption that a
properly addressed and stamped letter was received in due course of the
mails. Due to the large volume of mail and an automated system, the com-
pany could not present a witness who could remember receipt of one letter.
The court held that the insurer's testimony that the insured's payment could
not have been received before the cancellation date, coupled with the in-
surer's presentation of a cancelled check and a billing statement bearing a
post-accident date, were sufficient to rebut this presumption.5
The Texas Supreme Court twice considered inferences during the Survey
period. In Hernandez v. Kroger Co. 52 the Texas Supreme Court in a per
curiam opinion wrote that the store policy of placing floor rugs in the foyer
indicated that Kroger was aware that moisture or debris could have been
tracked into the store. 53 The court also wrote that the jury could have in-
ferred that the existence of moisture and debris in the foyer could constitute
an unreasonable risk of harm. 54 In SpoIjaric v. Percival Tours, Inc.55 the
Texas Supreme Court wrote that although a court usually determines a
party's intent at the time the party made a representation, the court may also
infer such intent from the party's subsequent acts after the representation is
made. 56
The Fifth Circuit held that the correct inference arising from an expert
witness's testimony regarding whether a defect in a grenade could have been
detected by x-ray inspection was a question for the jury. 57 Another question
for the jury was the inference arising from the expert's testimony that, in
thirty years of experience, he had never heard of a missing delay column in a
44. Id.
45. 789 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1986).
46. Id. at 1136.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1136-37.
49. Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Greenwade, 138 Tex. 450, 455, 159 S.W.2d 854, 857 (1942).
50. 704 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
51. Id. at 461.
52. 711 S.W.2d 3 (Tex. 1986).
53. Id. at 4.
54. Id.
55. 708 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. 1986).
56. Id. at 434.
57. McGonigal v. Gearhart Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 321, 327 (5th Cir. 1986).
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fully assembled grenade. 58
IV. ARTICLE IV-RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS
Article IV of the Texas Rules of Evidence specifically governs relevancy
and its limits. 59 Relevant evidence means "evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evi--
dence." 6° All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided
by the Constitution, by statute, or by other rules. 61 Evidence that is not rele-
vant is inadmissible.6 2
Several cases during the Survey period considered whether certain evi-
dence was relevant. In Thompson v. Mayes63 the Eastland court of appeals
reviewed a suit to impose a constructive trust on the devised assets of a devi-
see who killed a devisor. The court held that the devisee's tapes, made
before his suicide, but more than two years after the devisor's disappearance,
were not relevant. 64 The Corpus Christi court of appeals, in Group Hospital
Services, Inc. v. Daniel,65 held that testimony that a group health insurer had
denied similar claims was immaterial and irrelevant in a group health benefi-
ciary's action against the insurer for breach of contract, fraud, and violations
of the Texas Insurance Code.
66
In Sinko v. City of San Antonio6 7 the San Antonio court of appeals ex-
plained that evidence of an out-of-court experiment, made without the pres-
ence of the opposing party, may only be admissible if a substantial similarity
exists between the conditions at the time of the experiment and those sur-
rounding the event giving rise to the litigation.68 The court in Bauer v.
Lavaca-Navidad River Authority69 held that evidence of recent sales of other
property, meeting the test of similarity, should be admitted in an eminent
domain proceeding. 70 OSHA regulations are admissible into evidence as
being relevant to the standard of conduct that a defendant should have
employed. 71
Texas Rule of Evidence 403 provides for the exclusion of relevant evi-
dence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
58. Id.
59. TEX. R. EVID. art. IV.
60. Id. 401. One court during the Survey period explained that evidence is probative
when it is more than a surmise or a suspicion and tends to prove the proposition. Cactus Util.
Co. v. Larson, 709 S.W.2d 709, 715 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ granted).
61. TEx. R. EvID. 402.
62. Id.
63. 707 S.W.2d 951 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1986, no writ).
64. Id. at 954.
65. 704 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
66. Id. at 879.
67. 702 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
68. Id. at 204.
69. 704 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
70. Id. at 110.




unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by con-
siderations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence." 72 Several cases during the Survey period considered the propriety of
excluding relevant evidence, especially in situations in which the evidence
had a tendency to mislead or confuse the jury. One court, affirming the
admission of certain evidence, explained that relevant evidence is inherently
prejudicial, and only evidence that is unfairly prejudicial may be excluded. 73
The court further explained that evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it has an
undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis, such as, com-
monly, an emotional one.74 To determine whether to exclude relevant evi-
dence because of its potential for prejudicial or inflamatory effects upon the
jury, a court must weigh the prejudicial potential against the probative value
of the evidence. 75 The court in Missouri-Kansas- Texas Railroad v. Alvarez76
held that the trial court properly excluded evidence of a passenger's intoxica-
tion in an action by the passenger against the railroad for injuries sustained
in a train-automobile collision because the probative value of the evidence
was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.7 7 Another
court considered the potential prejudice against the manufacturer arising
from the introduction of an outboard motor's 1983 operations manual that
contained warnings about the absence of a kill-switch. The court held that
the manual's relevance in establishing the feasibility of providing warnings in
prior years outweighed any potential prejudice and was, therefore,
admissible.78
Texas Rule of Evidence 408, which excludes evidence of settlements and
offers to settle, does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for
another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice, or interest of a witness or
a party.79 An exception to the rule excluding settlement agreements is
granted for agreements that cause misalignments of the parties, such as
"Mary Carter" settlements, which present false or misleading portrayals of
the real interests of the parties to the jury. 80 The benefit of the exception is
normally granted to the party who will be harmed, the nonsettling defend-
ant.81 In Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick 82 appellees called a nonparty as an
adverse witness to establish what the court of appeals characterized as an
"unquestionably prejudicial guaranteed settlement agreement" 83 from an-
72. TEX. R. EVID. 403.
73. United States v. D.K.G. Appaloosas, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1540, 1562 (E.D. Tex. 1986).
74. Id. at 1562-63.
75. Jackson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 788 F.2d 1070, 1075 (5th Cir. 1986).
76. 703 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
77. Id. at 370.
78. Reece v. Mercury Marine Div. of Brunswick Corp., 793 F.2d 1416, 1429 (5th Cir.
1986).
79. TEX. R. EVID. 408.
80. City of Houston v. Sam P. Wallace & Co., 585 S.W.2d 669, 673-74 (Tex. 1979); Duval
County Ranch Co. v. Alamo Lumber Co., 663 S.W.2d 627, 635 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
81. See General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 857-58 (Tex. 1977).
82. 701 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985), rev'd, 724 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1986).
83. Id. at 9.
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other trial, even after the adverse witness denied knowledge of that agree-
ment. 84 The court of appeals wrote that an agreement from another trial
with different parties might be admissible under other circumstances, but
was not admissible under those circumstances.8 5  The court of appeals
found, however, that Scurlock waived the error in its closing argument to
the jury by using the inadmissible evidence for its own purposes.8 6 The
Texas Supreme Court reversed, explaining that "[h]aving properly objected,
Scurlock was not required to sit idly by and take its chances on appeal or
retrial when incompetent evidence was admitted .... Scurlock was entitled
to defend itself by explaining, rebutting, or demonstrating the untruthfulness
of the objectionable evidence without waiving its objection."'8 7
Courts often have difficulty determining whether a settlement agreement
is a "Mary Carter" agreement. In Singleton v. Crown Central Petroleum
Corp.88 the Houston court of appeals explained that the test for a Mary
Carter agreement is whether the settling defendant had a financial stake in
the success of the plaintiff's recovery. 9 Courts disfavor such agreements
because they may alter the posture of the parties and induce the settling
defendant to promote the plaintiff's cause of action against the nonsettling
defendant. The Singleton court found that under the terms of the settlement
agreement at issue, the financial interest of the appellant and the settling
party were not the same, and that the trial court properly excluded the evi-
dence of settlement from the jury.90 Compare Kennon v. Slipstreamer,
Inc.,91 in which the Fifth Circuit found that it was within the discretion of
the district court to admit evidence of the settlement agreement in order to
explain the absence of the settling defendants and avoid jury confusion. 92 It
was error, however, for the court to disclose to the jury the amount of the
settlement in the absence of compelling circumstances demanding
disclosure. 93
One court held evidence of settlement negotiations inadmissible in an ac-
tion for tortious interference with contract for the limited purpose of show-
ing malice. 94 Although evidence that a party to the settlement liked the
appellee may have been a proper subject for consideration by the jury, the




87. 724 S.W.2d at 4.
88. 713 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
89. Id. at 122.
90. Id. at 122-23; see also Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 714 S.W.2d 405,
406 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (trial court properly refused to inform
jury of settlement between plaintiff and one defendant when that defendant did not change its
position at trial after it settled with plaintiff).
91. 794 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1986).
92. Id. at 1070.
93. Id.




conduct and statements made at a settlement meeting.95
V. ARTICLE V-PRIVILEGES
Article V of the Texas Rules of Evidence governs privileges. No person
has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter 96 unless such a privilege is
recognized in the Rules of Evidence97 or specifically granted by statute98 or
by Constitution.99 The Dallas court of appeals wrote that, under the provi-
sions of Texas Rule of Evidence 502, Texas courts would be compelled to
honor a foreign jurisdiction's privilege when that jurisdiction requires by law
that certain information not be reported. 1°° The court held that appellee
failed to meet her burden of proving that certain information contained in an
investigation report of the Tel Aviv police was privileged under Israeli
law.101
Texas Rule of Evidence 503 codifies the prior common law lawyer-client
privilege.102 The lawyer-client privilege protects statements and advice of
the attorney as well as communications of the client. 10 3 In Dewitt &
Rearick Inc. v. Ferguson 104 defendants filed a counterclaim and third-party
action seeking to recover the amount they paid to a third-party in settlement
of a prior suit. Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel discovery regarding the
basis of the settlement. Plaintiffs contended that the defendants could not
countersue to recover the $350,000 paid in settlement on counsel's advice
and refuse discovery as to the substantive nature of the advice. The El Paso
court of appeals agreed, and held that the counter-plaintiffs were forced in
this case to elect to claim their privilege or abandon their claim.'0 5 The
Texas Supreme Court in Ginsberg v. Fifth Court of Appeals 106 explained that
a plaintiff cannot seek affirmative relief and simultaneously shield pertinent
and proper questions that may have a bearing upon the right to maintain the
actions by asserting a privilege. 10 7
A communication under the attorney-client privilege is confidential if it is
"not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom
disclosure is made in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal serv-
95. Id.
96. TEX. R. EvID. 501(2).
97. See id. 501-513.
98. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5561h (Vernon Supp. 1987), repealed by TEX. R.
EVID. 509-510 (eff. Sept. 1, 1983) and TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 509-510 (eff. Sept. 1, 1986) (confi-
dential communications between physician and patient relating to professional services ren-
dered by the physician are privileged).
99. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
100. Great Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Davidson, 708 S.W.2d 476, 478 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986,
no writ); see TEX. R. EVID. 502.
101. 708 S.W.2d at 478.
102. TEX. R. EVID. 503.
103. Harrell v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 339 S.W.2d 548, 550 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1960, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
104. 699 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, no writ).
105. Id. at 694.
106. 686 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. 1985).
107. Id. at 107.
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ices to the client .... ,,"o1 In Lewis v. State 10 9 a statement made by a sexual
abuse complainant's sister to the attorney ad litem for the complainant was
held not to be a privileged communication between attorney and client be-
cause it was made in the presence of the complainant and state case worker,
both of whom the sister considered to have an interest adverse to her own at
the time.110 In United States v. BallardI1I the Fifth Circuit wrote that a
defendant's malpractice suit against his former counsel may have arisen
from the same transactions that comprised the basis of the criminal suit at
issue.1 12 The malpractice suit did not operate as a waiver of the attorney-
client privilege for purposes of admitting the former counsel's testimony as
to conversations with the defendant concerning the subject matter of the
prosecution. The Fifth Circuit found, however, that the testimony was not a
privileged communication under the crime exception to the attorney-client
privilege. 113 The Fifth Circuit explained that once the party seeking disclo-
sure of the attorney-client confidences makes a prima facie case that the at-
torney-client relationship was used to promote an intended criminal activity,
the confidences within the relationship are no longer shielded.
114
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166b contains a "post-accident privilege"
that protects from discovery the post-accident communications of an agent,
representative, or employee of a party made in connection with the prosecu-
tion, investigation, or defense of the claim, or the investigation of the occur-
rence or transaction out of which the claim has arisen. 1 15 Like the attorney-
client privilege, this privilege can be waived when the party asserting it di-
vulges the information to third parties.' 16 In Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Railway v. Kirk 117 the Eastland court of appeals held that the railroad did
not waive its privilege to the post-accident communications of its special
agent who had participated in the investigation of a train wreck when the
railroad allowed the special agent to testify at a formal investigation hearing
at which third parties inquired into the train collision. 118 Federal regula-
tions required the railroad to reveal all data concerning train wrecks to these
third parties, and disclosure thus was not voluntary on the part of the rail-
road. 119 The court further explained that a compulsory disclosure of privi-
leged material in compliance with federal or state law does not constitute a
waiver of the privilege sought to be asserted in a later state court
108. TEX. R. EvID. 503(a)(5).
109. 709 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, pet. ref'd, untimely filed).
110. Id. at 736.
111. 779 F.2d 287 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1518, 89 L. Ed. 2d 917 (1986).
112. 779 F.2d at 292.
113. Id.; see, e.g., TEX. R. EvID. 503(d)(1) (no privilege is afforded if attorney's services
were sought for commission of a crime).
114. 779 F.2d at 292.
115. TEx. R. Civ. P. 166b(3)(d).
116. Dobbins v. Gardner, 377 S.W.2d 665, 668 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1964, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
117. 705 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1986, no writ).





In Mosby v. State '21 the defendant's admission of guilt to a psychologist,
privileged at the time it was made, did not remain privileged after a subse-
quent, pretrial enactment of an exception to the physician-patient privilege
excluding from the privilege conversations made by a patient who is a de-
fendant in a criminal prosecution.122 The court explained that article 5561h
is a procedural rule because it relates to the admissibility of evidence, and it
applied to the pending litigation as of its effective date.' 23
To be privileged under the fifth amendment, 124 testimony need not be cer-
tain to result in a finding of guilt; it need only have tendency to incriminate,
although the possibility of self-incrimination must not be "remote and specu-
lative."' 25 Several cases decided during the Survey period considered the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Johnson v. State 126 in-
volved the trial court's questioning of a defendant who had declared he
would not take the stand and testify. Despite the defendant's refusal to tes-
tify, the trial judge still asked him whether he was the individual whose con-
victions were reflected in the state's exhibits and whether he had in fact been
convicted. The appellate court held that such questioning violated the de-
fendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and consti-
tuted reversible error.127 Like other privileges, the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination can be waived. In United States v. Cop-
pola 128 the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant waived any personal privi-
lege he might have had with regard to the production of corporate
documents by voluntarily complying with the subpoena and failing to move
to quash it. 129 The Fifth Circuit explained that ordinarily a corporate agent
cannot assert a fifth amendment privilege against producing corporate
records regardless of whether they contain information incriminating him,
because the corporation itself has no fifth amendment privilege. 130 However,
an individual may have a fifth amendment privilege against being personally
compelled to produce documents.' 31 A witness also loses his privilege
against self-incrimination after he has been convicted of the same offense, as
occurred in Hayes v. State.' 32
120. Id. at 833.
121. 703 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1985, pet. granted).
122. Id. at 720; see TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5561h, § 4(a)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1987)
repealed by TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 509 (eff. Sept. 1, 1986) (in criminal proceedings no physi-
cian-patient privilege exists).
123. 703 S.W.2d at 721.
124. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
125. United States v. Whittington, 786 F.2d 644, 645-46 (5th Cir. 1986).
126. 704 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, pet. ref'd).
127. Id. at 141.
128. 788 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1986).
129. Id. at 309.
130. Id. at 308.
131. Id. at 309.




Texas does not set a minimum age for the competency of a child witness.
Texas Rule of Evidence 601(a) provides that to be competent as a witness, a
child must demonstrate to the court that he or she understands the responsi-
bilities of the oath and has sufficient intellect to discuss transactions while
under interrogation. 133 Inconsistencies in a child's testimony do not render
a child incompetent as a witness. 134
Texas courts have deemed the dead man's statute135 repealed as to civil
actions in conjunction with the adoption of the Texas Rules of Evidence.
This statute has been replaced by Texas Rule of Evidence 601(b), which
applies only to uncorroborated oral statements "[i]n actions by or against
executors, administrators, or guardians, in which judgment may be rendered
for or against them as such .... ,"136 Rule 601(b) extends to and includes
"all actions by or against the heirs of legal representatives of a decedent
based in whole or in part on such oral statement." 137 Rule 601(b) is much
more liberal than its predecessor, article 3716, which prohibited testimony
"as to any transaction with, or statement by, the testator, intestate or
ward."138 Rule 601(b) does not exclude evidence of any transaction. Rule
601(b) only excludes testimony as to any oral statement by the testator, in-
testate, or ward if the testimony to the oral statement is not corroborated. 139
The first case interpreting Texas Rule of Evidence 601(b), Tramel v. Es-
tate of Billings, 140 suggests that courts will strictly construe the rule and will
apply it only in very narrowly circumscribed cases. 141 Tramel was an in-
surer's interpleader action to determine which of two claimants was entitled
to the proceeds of two policies insuring the life of the deceased. The de-
ceased's ex-wife and his estate each claimed to be the legal beneficiary of the
life insurance proceeds. In considering whether rule 601(b) applied to this
case, the San Antonio court of appeals wrote that the determining factor is
the capacity in which the parties were sued. 142 The administrator was not
named as a party.143 The court distinguished Tramel from a case in which
the administrator is sued in that capacity and where judgment may thus be
133. TEX. R. EvID. 601(a)(2); Heckathorne v. State, 697 S.W.2d 8, 10 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1985, pet. ref'd).
134. 697 S.W.2d at 11.
135. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3716 (Vernon 1926), repealed by TEX. R. EvID.
601(b) (eff. Sept. 1, 1983).
136. TEX. R. EVID. 601(b).
137. Id.
138. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3716 (Vernon 1926), repealed by TEX. R. EVID.
601(b) (eff. Sept. 1, 1983).
139. TEX. R. EvID. 601(b). Like its predecessor, article 3716, this rule can be waived if
"the witness is called at the trial to testify thereto by the opposite party ...." (emphasis
added). Id. The words "at the trial" were added in the amendment to the rule effective Nov.
1, 1984. Unlike its predecessor, the rule will not be waived by questions to the opposite party
during discovery.
140. 699 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
141. Id. at 261-62.
142. Id. at 263.
143. In Tramel the insurance company sought a declaration of the rightful legal beneficiary
of the proceeds of the policies. It sued the estate and the ex-wife as possible beneficiaries. An
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rendered against him as such. 14 This distinction is impossible. "[T]he 'es-
tate' of a decedent is not a legal entity and may not properly sue or be sued
as such."' 45 The Tramel opinion does not consider whether the estate could
have become a party without naming the administrator. The court stated
that because he was not named as a party, the administrator "is not [a per-
son] for or against whom judgment may be rendered."' 146  But judgment
cannot be rendered for or against the estate, which is not a legal entity. It is
also questionable that the estate could "seek recovery only in [its] own
right"'147 without ultimately subjecting the estate to a judgment for or
against "the heirs or legal representatives of a decedent,"'148 in which case
rule 601(b) would apply to this case.
The Tramel court held that rule 601(b) did not apply.' 49 The court rea-
soned that because of the nontestamentary character of the proceeds,' 50 and
because a specific beneficiary had been designated,' 5' the right to the pro-
ceeds of the policies was not one based upon any right inherited from the
decedent.152 Rule 601(b), however, does not condition its applicability on
the testamentary character of the interest in controversy. 53 Rule 60 1(b)
permits testimony as to an oral statement of the testator if the testimony is
corroborated, but the rule does not state how such testimony is
corroborated.
In Tramel the trial court admitted the estate administrator's testimony as
to the deceased's oral statement that he wished to change the beneficiary of
the proceeds of the two life insurance policies. Following this conversation,
the administrator sent a letter to the insurance company requesting the
change of beneficiary. The company made this change before the insured's
death. The trial court concluded that the administrator's testimony as to the
oral statement was corroborated by the administrator's letter to the insur-
estate, however, is not a legal entity. See infra notes 144-48 and accompanying text. Appar-
ently this party defect never was raised, nor was it discussed by the court.
144. 699 S.W.2d at 263.
145. Price v. Estate of Anderson, 522 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex. 1975).
146. 699 S.W.2d at 263.
147. Id.
148. TEX. R. EVID. 601(b).
149. 699 S.W.2d at 264.
150. Id. at 262. Considering § 450(a)(1) of the Texas Probate Code, the court stated, "It is
plain the right to the proceeds does not accrue as a testamentary right to those who will take
under the laws of descent and distribution. In that respect they are not 'heirs'. Proceeds of an
insurance policy are by statutory definition nontestamentary in nature." Id. at 262 (citing
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 450(a)(1) (Vernon 1980).
151. "A beneficiary is defined as one to whom a policy of insurance effected is payable."
Id. (citing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.01, § 9 (Vernon 1981).
152. The court explained that both the estate and the wife were in the posture of a legal
beneficiary, basing its decision on TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.01, § 9 (Vernon 1981). The
court reasoned that if the ex-wife or the estate had sued the insurance company, either would
stand on its own right and not upon any right claimed as inherited from the decedent. "The
same can be said of [their] position in this interpleader suit." 699 S.W.2d at 262. "In the
context of this suit, there are no heirs." Id. But see supra text accompanying notes 150-51.
153. The rule applies, by its own terms, "[i]n actions by or against executors, administra-
tors, or guardians, in which judgment may be rendered for or against them as such .... " and
extends to and includes "all actions by or against the heirs or legal representatives of a dece-
dent based in whole or in part on such oral statement." TEX. R. EvID. 601(b).
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ance company. 1 54
The San Antonio court of appeals did not determine whether the adminis-
trator's letter was independent corroboration of an oral statement because of
its conclusion that Texas Rule of Evidence 601(b) did not apply. The opin-
ion, however, contains much dicta regarding the requirements for corrobora-
tive evidence.1 55 The court seems to have reached the correct result not
because rule 601(b) did not apply, but because the administrator's testimony
as to the oral statement was corroborated by documentary evidence that
would have been legally sufficient under the standard articulated in the
opinion. 156
In Bobbit v. Bass157 the El Paso court of appeals considered how much
corroboration Texas Rule of Evidence 601(b) requires. Rejecting the strict
test that evidence must be sufficient to go to the jury and on which a verdict
might be returned, 58 the El Paso court adopted a line of cases holding that
the corroborating evidence need not be sufficient standing alone to support
the verdict, but must tend to confirm and strengthen the testimony of the
witness and show the probability of its truth.1 59
The Tramel court characterized the testimony in question as relating to a
transaction with the deceased, rather than to an oral statement.160 Although
it is not at all clear that this testimony related to a transaction and not to an
oral statement, the court correctly noted that testimony as to transactions
with a decedent may now come into evidence through testimony that courts
would have excluded in the past.' 6 ' "The phrase 'any transaction with' ob-
viously included more than uncorroborated oral statements of a deceased
"162
It is regrettable that two justices 63 concurred in Tramel's result without
writing a concurring opinion, and even more regrettable that Tramel has no
writ history. The last Texas Supreme Court case to consider the dead man's
statute' 64 seemed to adopt by implication the widespread, severe criticism of
154. 699 S.W.2d at 262.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. 713 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1986, writ dism'd).
158. Id. at 220.
159. Id.; see Schwartz v. Davis Mfg. Co., 31 Mich. App. 451, 189 N.W.2d 1, 3 (1971) (no
longer necessary that corroborating evidence must, standing alone, tend to prove essential alle-
gations); Peck v. Wright, 70 N.M. 259, 372 P.2d 831, 832 (1962) (corroborating evidence no
longer needs to be able to stand alone and unsupported to be admissible); Hereford v. Paytes,
226 Va. 604, 311 S.E.2d 790, 792 (1984) (in case involving Virginia dead man's statute, cor-
roborating evidence need not be sufficient by itself to support a verdict, but only tend to con-
firm and strengthen witness's testimony).
160. 699 S.W.2d at 264.
161. Id.
162. Black, Article VI, Witnesses, 20 Hous. L. REv. 409, 412 (1983) (Tex. R. Evid. Hand-
book). Included within the definition of transaction was "every method by which one person
can derive impressions or information from the conduct, condition, or language of another."
Dominguez v. Garcia, 36 S.W.2d 299, 299 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1931), aff'd, 53 S.W.2d
459 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932, judgmt adopted).
163. Justices Cantu and Reeves concurred in the result but not in the opinion.
164. Lewis v. Foster, 621 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. 1981).
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it, 165 and the Texas Supreme Court in the past has construed the dead man's
statute narrowly. 166 Notwithstanding the State Bar Liaison Committee's
recommendation to eliminate the dead man's statute, 167 the Texas Supreme
Court promulgated rule 601(b).1 68 The Texas Supreme Court obviously in-
tended to retain portions of the dead man's statute. The supreme court has
written that the purpose of the rule is to render incompetent testimony that
the deceased, if living, could controvert, and to prevent one party from tak-
ing advantage of the other because the lips of the deceased are sealed. 169
The Tramel court seems to have reached the right result for the wrong
reasons. Under Tramel's reasoning, a party would seem to be able to avoid
application of rule 601(b) by filing suit against an estate without naming the
executor or administrator and hoping, as apparently happened in Tramel,
that the opposing party neither notices nor complains of the defect in a nec-
essary party. Tramel should have limited precedential value. Even when a
court applies it correctly, Texas Rule of Evidence 601(b) will exclude far less
evidence than its predecessor.
Texas Rule of Evidence 605 provides that a presiding judge at a trial may
not testify as a witness. 170 In Duvall v. Sadler 17 1 the Texarkana court of
appeals held that a presiding judge's recitation of the facts in a case for the
purposes of clarifying the record did not constitute an unchallenged qualifi-
cation of the bill of exceptions under the terms and provisions of Texas Rule
of Civil Procedure 372(e). 172 The court explained that the qualification con-
sists of the testimony of the presiding judge, and that such testimony will not
be considered for any purpose.' 73
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which is identical to Texas Rule of Evi-
dence 606(b), provides that "a juror may not testify as to any matter or
statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations ... except
... on the question of whether extraneous prejudicial information was im-
properly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was
improperly brought to bear upon any juror."' 174 In Jones v. Frank 175 the
Western District of Texas, Austin Division, considered the appeal by an un-
successful plaintiff to inquire into the thought processes of the jury. Since
the juror in question had testified that no outside influence affected the deci-
sion of any juror and that the jury did not consider any extraneous prejudi-
cial information during its deliberations, the plaintiff had no such right of
165. Id. at 402-403; see also 1 R. RAY, supra note 33, § 337 (dead man's statute does more
harm than good because it frequently prevents establishment of meritorious claims).
166. See 621 S.W.2d at 404 (a court should not apply the dead man's statute when the
testimony of the deceased as to a given transaction has been given and preserved, and is avail-
able to both parties to the suit).
167. Black, supra note 162, at 413.
168. Id.
169. 621 S.W.2d at 402.
170. TEX. R. EVID. 605.
171. 711 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
172. Id. at 376.
173. Id.
174. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).




In Clancy v. Zale Corp. 177 the appellant offered evidence of alleged jury
misconduct in an action against a handgun manufacturer. The evidence in-
cluded an affidavit by a juror that quoted the jury foreman as stating that the
jury could not try law or change law, and could not penalize manufacturers
for doing something within the law. Other affidavits by the juror stated that
during jury deliberations there was a major discussion about the legality of
the sale of the handgun; that the jury did not balance the risk against the
utility of the handgun; and that the jury discussed paint thinner and con-
cluded that the manufacturer should not be sued because a teenager sus-
tained brain damage from sniffing paint thinner. The court concluded that
these statements were not admissible as evidence of outside influence upon a
jury. 17 8
Texas Rule of Evidence 608(a) provides that an adverse party may attack
a witness's truthful character before the witness can offer evidence of truth-
ful character. 179 In Rose v. Intercontinental Bank 180 the Houston court of
appeals affirmed the exclusion of a witness's personal opinion of a party's
character. The court explained it did not need to decide whether Rose's
character had been attacked, such as to allow rehabilitating evidence under
rule 608, because the evidence offered as to his good character was inadmis-
sible personal opinion of a party's character.'18 This decision is wrong be-
cause Texas Rule of Evidence 608(a) provides that "[t]he credibility of a
witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or
reputation .. . ,182 if the evidence refers only to character for truthful-
ness. 183 In United States v. Dotson 184 the Fifth Circuit held that the fact that
a government agent investigated the defendant, knew the defendant, or had
some contacts with defendant's witnesses, is not a sufficiently reliable basis
for that agent to state his opinion or to testify before the jury in order to
contradict the testimony of the defendant and his witnesses.' 8 5 In the ab-
sence of some underlying basis to demonstrate that the opinion was ration-
ally based on perception of the witness and will be helpful to the jury in
determining the fact of credibility, the opinion should not be part of the
evidence. 186
Texas Rule of Evidence 609(a) provides that evidence that a witness has
been convicted of a crime is admissible only if the crime was a felony or
176. Id. at 1121.
177. 705 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
178. Id. at 828-29.
179. TEX. R. EVID. 608(a).
180. 705 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
181. Id. at 757.
182. TEX. R. EvID. 608(a).
183. Id. 608(a)(1).
184. 799 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1986).
185. Id. at 193.
186. Id. FED. R. EvID. 701, which is identical to TEx. R. EvID. 701, provides that lay
opinion testimony is limited to those opinions that are "(a) rationally based on the perception
of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of
a fact in issue."
[Vol. 41
EVIDENCE
involved moral turpitude.'8 7 In Dewberry v. Brookshire Brothers1 88 the
Beaumont court of appeals held that the admission of the plaintiff's munici-
pal court conviction for the theft of a 51 cent carton of chocolate milk was
harmful error in the plaintiff's action against the store for false imprison-
ment. 189 The court, nevertheless, allowed the plaintiff to show that the
county court had dismissed the municipal court conviction. 190
Texas Rule of Evidence 612(a) governs prior inconsistent statements.' 9'
In Phelan v. Lopez 192 the court admitted evidence of an injured worker's
settlement of a workers' compensation claim for the purpose of showing that
the worker had made prior inconsistent statements. 193 The injured worker
sought relief in a negligence action against the owners of the building. The
settlement offer was admissible because it showed that the worker had not
alleged a back injury but had mentioned only a knee injury in his workers'
compensation claim. 194
VII. ARTICLE VII-OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. Lay Opinion
The Texas Rules of Evidence have greatly liberalized the admission of
opinion testimony by lay witness. 195 Texas law has always been liberal,
however, in allowing an owner of property to testify as to his opinion of its
value. 196 An owner of property can give such testimony even though he
would not qualify to testify as an expert regarding the value of the same
property if it were owned by another person.' 97 However, it must still be
shown that the owner is qualified to so testify. 198 In Vista Chevrolet, Inc. v.
Lewis' 9 9 a buyer of an automobile who revoked her acceptance was not
qualified to testify regarding the value of the automobile. 2° °
B. Competency of Expert
Texas Rule of Evidence 702 provides that "[i]f scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
187. TEX. R. EVID. 609(a).
188. 699 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, no writ).
189. Id. at 686.
190. Id.
191. TEX. R. EvID. 612(a).
192. 701 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, no writ).
193. Id. at 334.
194. Id.
195. TEX. R. EVID. 701 (a lay witness may testify if his opinions are rationally based and
help to clarify facts or misunderstandings).
196. Classified Parking Sys. v. Kirby, 507 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1974, no writ) (owner of car stolen from parking garage was competent to testify
as to car's value).
197. Id.
198. Superior Trucks, Inc. v. Allen, 664 S.W.2d 136, 146-47 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
199. 704 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985), rev'd on other grounds per curiam,
709 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. 1986).
200. 704 S.W.2d at 371.
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evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert...
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. ' 20 1 During the
Survey period one court held an attorney-defendant in a malpractice action
to be qualified to offer expert opinion to establish the standard of compe-
tence for legal representation in his locale.202 Similarly, a physician-defend-
ant was held to be a proper expert to establish the standard of care owed to
the patient.20 3 A rehabilitation counselor who was familiar with the plain-
tiff's injuries, job skills, and employment potentials was qualified to testify as
to the effect of the worker's disability on plaintiff's returning to his prior line
of work.2°4 In an action against a fire insurer for a breach of contract an-
other court properly admitted the testimony of a witness who was hired by
the insured to make repair estimates. 20 5 The witness had a general knowl-
edge of the value of houses in the area, had been in the construction business
for many years, and had attended a real estate appraisal seminar.206 Courts
have held that a landowner's testimony as to the cost of restoring his prop-
erty is not admissible in an action arising after the county removed dirt from
his property to reconstruct access to a river crossing.207 A court also found
inadmissible an expert's testimony as to the functionality of reconfiguration
of an ice shaving machine, when the witness had no education beyond high
school and no experience in the area of ice shaving machine design.
208
C. Facts Forming Basis of Opinion
An expert may base his opinions on facts perceived by him or made
known to him at or before trial.2°9 If of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in particular field, the facts or data need not be admissible in evi-
dence. 210 In Ossorio v. Leon 211 the court held that affidavits of a lawyer's
legal opinion on Mexican law were not based on hearsay because, being legal
opinions, they were properly based on the facts as related to the affiants. 212
In an action to impose a constructive trust on the devised assets of the devi-
see the court concluded that testimony of an expert on a "psychological au-
topsy" that concerned a devisee's state of mind at the time he allegedly killed
the devisor was not admissible. 213 The testimony, which was based on infor-
201. TEX. R. EvID. 702.
202. Tijerina v. Wennermark, 700 S.W.2d 342, 347 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no
writ).
203. Beal v. Hamilton, 712 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no
writ).
204. Baker Marine Corp. v. Herrera, 704 S.W.2d 58, 61-62 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
205. Hochheim Prairie Farm Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Burnett, 698 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
206. Id. at 276.
207. Uvalde County v. Barrier, 710 S.W.2d 740, 744 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no
writ).
208. Sno-Wizard Mfg. Inc. v. Eisemann Prod. Co., 791 F.2d 423, 426 (5th Cir. 1986).
209. TEX. R. EvID. 703.
210. Id.
211. 705 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
212. Id. at 221.
213. Thompson v. Mayes, 707 S.W.2d 951, 956-57 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1986, no writ).
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mation gathered after the devisee's suicide, was held not to be the type of
scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge needed by the jury to decide
whether the devisee intentionally and wrongfully killed the devisor.2 14
D Subject of Expert Testimony
1. Matters Directly in Issue
Texas Rule of Evidence 704 provides that testimony in the form of an
opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it em-
braces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.2 15 In Tarrant
County Hospital District v. Ray2 16 the Fort Worth court of appeals excluded
the testimony of a medical expert that an injury could have occurred without
proximately being caused by negligence of any party not because the ques-
tion invaded the province of the jury, but because it embraced a mixed ques-
tion of law and fact.2 17 In Withrow v. Shaw21 8 a Department of Public
Safety officer testified "that defendant was making a 'legal pass' to the left of
plaintiff and 'was not violating the law or any traffic violations when he tried
and attempted to pass [plaintiff].' "219 In reversing and remanding, the
Beaumont court of appeals explained that even though the officer was quali-
fied as an accident reconstruction expert, he was not permitted to give state-
ments of law.220
2 Proper Subjects for Expert Testimony
Several cases decided during the Survey period concerned the nature of
subjects upon which experts may express an opinion. Courts held proper
subjects for expert testimony to be: testimony that the "line of vegetation"
around a beach corresponded to the existing sea wall, for purposes of a stat-
ute providing that the public could establish prescriptive right in a beach up
to the line of vegetation; 22 ' testimony by the government's two attorneys
relating to the opinions about ownership of seized property;222 and testi-
mony identifying a tract of land claimed by adverse possession, which in-
cluded testimony interpreting aerial photographs of the tracts of land in
question. 223 Courts also admitted testimony of plaintiff's experts that a
proper engineering analysis and design approach could have avoided the fail-
ures that occurred in the vehicle manufactured by defendant. 224 This testi-
214. Id.
215. TEX. R. EvID. 704.
216. 712 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
217. Id. at 274.
218. 709 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
219. Id. at 760.
220. Id.
221. Villa Nober Resort, Inc. v. State, 711 S.W.2d 120, 126 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1986, no writ).
222. United States v. D.K.G. Appaloosas, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1540, 1564 (E.D. Tex. 1986).
223. De Alonzo v. Soils, 709 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).




mony was evidence that a design defect or negligent design caused the
occurrence in question. Courts also admitted expert testimony that most
people buy hand guns for self-defense, that less than one percent of hand
guns manufactured were involved in homicides, suicides, and accidents, and
that poor people had the greatest need for hand guns as protection. 225
During the Survey period several courts allowed experts to express opin-
ions regarding due care and proper conduct. In a medical malpractice ac-
tion a court held that testimony about the cause of the decedent's cardiac
arrest and its foreseeability was admissible.226 Courts also admitted expert
testimony that absent reduction of breast size, breast lift surgeries on a pa-
tient whose breasts were both large and sagging would fail, 227 and testimony
by an expert who examined a metal stilt following an accident as to whether
it contained a design defect. 228 The Fifth Circuit held that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in rejecting an expert's testimony that supported
a stevedore's widow's contention that the crating of masonite hardwood was
not reasonably adequate and safe, where at least two other witnesses dis-
agreed with the expert.229
Other subjects that courts held to be proper for expert testimony included:
a veterinarian's testimony that the cause of certain dogs' medical problems
was bacterial infection from pollution from a city's sewage treatment
plant; 230 testimony of a naval architect that a barge, when loaded and before
ballast was added, met Coast Guard stability requirements; 23' an account-
ant's opinion on the declining value of a business; 232 testimony of real estate
experts that a high-pressure natural gas pipeline would reduce the market
value of land suited for rural subdivision purposes;2 33 and the testimony of
an expert that the failure of a safety suit manufacturer to warn that the suit
did not protect from convective heat was a producing cause of injuries and
death of an employee wearing this suit at the time a flash fire occurred at an
ammunitions plant.2 34 Also held to be admissible were an economist's testi-
mony as to the present value of an injured employee's earnings over his
thirty-two year work-life expectancy,23 5 and expert testimony concerning
225. Clancy v. Zale Corp., 705 S.W.2d 820, 827-28 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
226. Ortiz v. Santa Rosa Medical Center, 702 S.W.2d 701, 705 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
227. Wall v. Noble, 705 S.W.2d 727, 730 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
228. Dura-Stilts Co. v. Zachry, 697 S.W.2d 658, 662 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
229. Gilmore v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 790 F.2d 1244, 1246 (5th Cir. 1986).
230. City of Uvalde v. Crow, 713 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
231. Bosnor, S.A. De C.V. v. Tug L.A. Barrios, 796 F.2d 776, 780-81 (5th Cir. 1986).
232. West v. Carter, 712 S.W.2d 569, 572 (Tex. App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1986, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
233. Devco, Ltd. v. Murray, 705 S.W.2d 836, 839 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1986, writ
granted).
234. Koonce v. Quaker Safety Prods. & Mfg. Co., 798 F.2d 700, 718 (5th Cir. 1986).
235. Knight v. Texaco, Inc., 786 F.2d 1296, 1300 (5th Cir. 1986).
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foregone interest on money lost through unauthorized trades.236
In Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad v. Alvarez 23 7 the Austin court of ap-
peals held that a witness disqualified as an expert because of late disclosure
could not testify as a fact witness concerning certain related matters. 238 The
court determined that he would be testifying in an expert capacity even
though called a "fact witness.' 239 Because he was disqualified as an expert,
the disqualification encompasses all matters of fact to which he testified in
giving his expert opinion. 24 °
E. Effect of Opinion Testimony
When several values are given for an item or property, or a witness con-
cedes that the value may be lower or higher than his estimate, the trial
court's finding on value should be within the range of values in evidence. 24 '
Juries are not bound to follow expert testimony, and may disregard it and
base their decision on their collective judgment and experience. 24 2
VIII. ARTICLE VIII-HEARSAY
A. Identifying Hearsay
Whether a record or statement offered to prove its own truth is hearsay is
often difficult to determine.243 "'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evi-
dence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."' 244 In Tejas Gas Corp. v.
Herrin24 5 the court held that newspaper accounts were not hearsay under
Texas Rule of Evidence 801(d) because the parties did not offer them into
evidence for the truth of the matters asserted, but used them to test the basis
of the expert's opinions on the public's fear of a pipeline. 246 Compare
Clancey v. Zale Corp.,247 in which newspaper articles attached to a motion
for new trial were unsworn and held to be hearsay under Texas Rule of
Evidence 801(a).
236. Smoky Greenhaw Cotton Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 785
F.2d 1274, 1278 (5th Cir. 1986).
237. 703 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
238. Id. at 371.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Mata v. Mata, 710 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
242. Moore v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 1061, 1064-65 (5th Cir. 1986).
243. TEx. R. EvID. 801-806 comprehensively define the hearsay rule and its exceptions.
Additionally, "[a] witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to
support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter." Id. 602.
244. Id. 801(d). "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court or by law." Id. 802.
245. 705 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 716 S.W.2d 45
(Tex. 1986).
246. 705 S.W.2d at 181.
247. 705 S.W.2d 820, 828 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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B. Statements That Are Not Hearsay
Texas Rule of Evidence 801(c) excludes from the definition of hearsay
prior statements by a witness,248 admissions by party-opponents, 249 and
depositions.250
1. Prior Statement by Witness
Not all prior statements by a witness are admissible. Prior statements are
admissible only if they are inconsistent with the declarant's present trial tes-
timony and given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury, 251 or if they
are consistent with the declarant's testimony and are offered to rebut an ex-
press or implied charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or mo-
tive, 25 2 or if they constitute identification of person made after perceiving
him.253 Additionally, prior statements are admissible only if the declarant
testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement. 254
2. Admission by Party Opponent
a. Party's Own Statement. A statement is not hearsay if the statement is
offered against a party and if it is his own statement in either his individual
or representative capacity. 255 In Rose v. Intercontinental Bank, N.A. 256 the
court properly admitted a witness's testimony that the defendant told him
the defendant's truck line was in bankruptcy because it was defendant's own
statement and it was offered against him.257
b. Judicial Admissions. A fact that is judicially admitted does not re-
quire supporting evidence, and the judicial admission establishes the fact as a
matter of law, thereby precluding the fact finder from finding any contrary
facts.258 A judicial admission is actually a substitute for evidence. 259 The
Texas Rules of Evidence, while not specifically distinguishing judicial admis-
sions from other admissions, treat admissions not as exceptions to the hear-
say rule, but rather as statements that are not hearsay.26°
During the Survey period several courts considered judicial admissions.
One court held that a defaulting garnishee bank's admission in its brief of








256. 705 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
257. Id. at 757.
258. 1A R. RAY, supra note 33, § 1147. The Texas Supreme Court established five require-
ments for judicial admissions in Griffin v. Superior Ins. Co., 161 Tex. 195, 201, 338 S.W.2d
415, 419 (1960). This opinion, as well as the strong dissent by four justices, contains a compre-
hensive discussion of the nuances involved in judicial admissions. Id. at 202-07, 338 S.W.2d at
418-19.
259. IA R. RAY, supra note 33, § 1127.
260. See TEX. R. EVID. 801(e)(2).
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service of a writ of garnishment was a judicial admission precluding the bank
from asserting that service was defective.261 In a divorce proceeding a sworn
inventory and appraisement by the wife listing two-thirds of her jewelry as
community property was a judicial admission that not all jewelry was her
separate property.262 In addition, when appellant admitted in his verified
answer that he was the record holder of the vehicle in question, the Fort
Worth court of appeals overruled his objection that there was no evidence as
to the record owner. 263
If a statement is to be held a judicial admission, it must be deliberate,
clear, and unequivocal. 264 A court held that a corporate president's state-
ments that he reserved the right to determine the extent and direction of the
corporation's growth concerning water lines, and that he had the duty to fix
problems relating to corporate responsibility were not judicial admissions.265
Because the statements were consistent with the president's control of the
corporation and function as president, the statements were not judicial ad-
missions that the corporation was the president's alter ego. 266 The Corpus
Christi court of appeals held that an occupant of property may assert an
interest in the property in a trespass to try title action because he and his
former wife signed an affidavit of tenancy years earlier, and no evidence ex-
isted that they made the affidavit of tenancy in the course of a judicial pro-
ceeding. 267 Another court held that deposition testimony contradicting
rather than clarifying an affidavit statement did not rise to the level of a
judicial admission.268 Similarly, testimony of a party that merely contra-
dicts some other portion of the party's testimony did not have conclusive
effect and was not a judicial admission.269
c. Vicarious Admissions. Texas Rule of Evidence 801(e)(2)(D) reversed
the much criticized holding of Big Mack Trucking Co. v. Dickerson.270 In
Big Mack the Texas Supreme Court limited the category of agent or servant
admissions that are admissible against the principal.2 7' Under the new rule,
admissions of agents or employees are admissible if the agent makes them
261. First Nat'l Bank v. Peterson, 709 S.W.2d 276, 280-81 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
262. Roosevelt v. Roosevelt, 699 S.W.2d 372, 374 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, writ dism'd
w.o.j.).
263. One 1984 Ford v. State, 698 S.W.2d 279, 286 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
264. William B. Roberts, Inc. v. McDrilling Co., 579 S.W.2d 335, 345 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1979, no writ).
265. Aztec Management & Inv. Co. v. McKenzie, 709 S.W.2d 237, 238 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
266. Id.
267. Balaban v. Balaban, 712 S.W.2d 775, 778 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
268. Adams v. Tri-Continental Leasing Corp., 713 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1986, no writ).
269. Miller v. Miller, 700 S.W.2d 941, 949 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
270. 497 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. 1973).
271. The Texas Supreme Court held that the hearsay statements of an agent or employee
should be admitted against a principal as vicarious admissions only when the trial judge finds,
as a preliminary matter, that the statements were authorized. Id. at 287.
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during the existence of an employment relationship and they concern mat-
ters within the scope of the employment relationship, even though the agent
or servant has no authority to speak.272 In State v. Buckner Construction
Co. 273 the court admitted a state auditor's statement regarding the state's
attitude towards a contractor's claim in a breach of contract action against
the state. The court held that the statement was an admission by a party
opponent concerning a matter within the scope of his employment under
Texas Rule of Evidence 801(e)(2)(D). 274 Similarly, a court held that an at-
torney's statements concerning any matter in the scope of his employment
were admissible as vicarious admissions under Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(D), which is identical to Texas Rule of Evidence 801(e)(2)(D). 275
d. Depositions. Depositions taken and offered in accordance with the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure are not hearsay. 276 During the Survey pe-
riod, the San Antonio court of appeals, in Norsul Oil & Mining Ltd. v. Com-
mercial Equipment Leasing Co.,277 admitted deposition testimony as an
admission of a party opponent under Texas Rule of Evidence 801(e)(2). 278
C. Hearsay Exceptions: Availability of Declarant Immaterial
1. Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition
Texas Rule of Evidence 803(3) admits into evidence, as exceptions to the
hearsay rule, statements of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emo-
tion, sensation, or physical condition. 279 In Knesek v. Witte280 the court
held that the testatrix's former husband's statements were admissible to
show an oral contract for wills. 281 The court concluded that the statements
by the testatrix's former husband that they had made a will for the purpose
of leaving all the property to her former husband's nieces and nephews were
admissible under Texas Rule of Evidence 803(3) as statements depicting the
former husband's existing state of mind. 282 In Payne v. Edmonson283 the
court allowed evidence about negotiations between the owner of an allegedly
dominant estate and the owner of the servient estate. The negotiations con-
cerned a lease for easement rights before the dominant estate owner
purchased the tract. The court concluded that these negotiations and state-
ments that the dominant estate owner never claimed the right to use the
property without a lease were admissible under Texas Rule of Evidence
803(3).284 The court wrote that this evidence was probative of the claim that
272. TEX. R. EvID. 801(e)(2)(D).
273. 704 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
274. Id. at 845-46.
275. United States v. D.K.G. Appaloosas, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1540 (E.D. Tex. 1986).
276. TEX. R. EvID. 801(e)(3).
277. 703 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
278. Id. at 348.
279. TEX. R. EvID. 803(3).
280. 715 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
281. Id. at 197.
282. Id.
283. 712 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
284. Id. at 797.
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the dominant estate owner did not rely on an oral promise by the servient
estate owner to permit parking on the property.28 5
2. Business Records
Texas Rule of Evidence 803(6)286 governs the introduction of records of
regularly conducted activities, commonly known as business records, once
certain prerequisites of that rule are "shown by the testimony of the custo-
dian or other qualified witness. ' 287 Preserving the statutory requirements of
repealed article 3737(e),288 rule 803(6) requires that a person with knowl-
edge at or near the time of the matter recorded must have kept the informa-
tion and records in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and
that it was the regular practice of the business to make such records. 289 The
court in Curran v. Unis 29° held partnership income tax returns admissible as
business records.291 In Ronk v. Parking Concepts of Texas, Inc.292 alleged
police records were not admissible because the records custodian testified
that he had not seen them before and that he could not testify that the docu-
ments were true and accurate copies of documents on file at the police de-
partment.293 When the business records that a party seeks to introduce are
computer records, the party need not prove that the particular computing
equipment involved is recognized as standard equipment by persons who
understand the operation of the equipment and whose regular duty is to
operate it.294 Such matters go to the weight of the evidence and not its
admissibility, one court held during the Survey period.295
3. Public Records and Reports
Texas Rule of Evidence 803(8) admits as exceptions to the hearsay rule
records, reports, statements, or data compilations of public offices or agen-
cies setting forth their activities, matters observed pursuant to duties im-
posed by law on which they have a duty to report, or factual findings
resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by
law. 296 This rule is identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8). Two cases
285. Id.
286. TEX. R. EVID. 803(6). The new practice of qualifying business records remains sub-
stantially the same as the procedure under former TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e
(Vernon Supp. 1987), repealed by TEX. R. EvID. 803 (eff. Sept. 1, 1983).
287. TEX. R. EvID. 803(6). Rule 803(10) permits the introduction of business records
accompanied by an affidavit that conforms to the requirements set forth in that rule. Id.
803(10).
288. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e (Vernon Supp. 1987), repealed by TEX. R.
EVID. 803 (eff. Sept. 1, 1983).
289. TEX. R. EvID. 803(6).
290. 711 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
291. Id. at 295.
292. 711 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
293. Id. at 416.
294. Longoria v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 699 S.W.2d 298, 302 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1985, no writ).
295. Id.
296. TEX. R. EVID. 803(8).
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decided during the Survey period reviewed evidence that did not meet the
standards of rule 803(8). In Horvath v. Baylor University Medical Center297
a publication of the United States Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare containing recommended guidelines for a phenylketonuria screening
program lacked the reliability displayed by public records of factual events
and was properly excluded as hearsay. 298 In Koonce v. Quaker Safety Prod-
ucts & Manufacturing Co. 299 the Fifth Circuit held that an interoffice memo-
randum written soon after a fatal accident describing the steps taken by the
employer as a result of the accident was inadmissible as hearsay, when the
memo outlined future inquiries into safety measures and offered opinions on
expected results, and did not involve a hearing or comprehensive
investigation.300
4. Statement Against Interest
Texas Rule of Evidence 803(24) admits into evidence, as exceptions to the
hearsay rule, statements that at the time of their making were so far contrary
to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interests that a reasonable person
would not have made them unless the declarant believed them to be true.30 1
In Robinson v. Harkins & Co. 302 the Texas Supreme Court held that the
husband's filing of an injury report notice to the Industrial Accident Board
and the husband's inculpatory statements to his wife after the accident were
admissible in the wife's personal injury suit against the husband's em-
ployer.30 3 The court based its ruling on the ground that the declarations
were against the husband's pecuniary, penal, and social interest, and there-
fore were admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule under Texas Rule of
Evidence 803(24). 304
D. Hearsay Exceptions: Declarant Unavailable
Texas Rule of Evidence 804 contains exceptions to the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness.305 Texas Rule of Evidence 804(a)(3)
defines unavailability to include a witness who "testifies to a lack of memory
of the subject matter of his statement. '30 6 Federal Rule of Evidence
804(a)(3) is identical to Texas Rule of Evidence 804(a)(3). In North Missis-
sippi Communications, Inc. v. Jones30 7 the Fifth Circuit held that Federal
Rule of Evidence 804(a)(3), which makes hearsay testimony admissible if a
witness testified that he has no memory of events to which his hearsay state-
ment relates, did not apply to a witness who stated that he lacked memory as
297. 704 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
298. Id. at 870.
299. 798 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1986).
300. Id. at 720.
301. TEX. R. EVID. 803(24).
302. 711 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1986).
303. Id. at 621.
304. Id.
305. TEX. R. EvID. 804.
306. Id. 804(a)(3).
307. 792 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1986).
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to the particular detail of a conversation but did remember the general sub-
ject matter discussed. 308 A statement made by a declarant while believing
that his death was imminent, and concerning the cause or circumstances of
what he believed to be his impending death, is not excluded by the hearsay
rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness.3°9 In a case in which the
cause or circumstances of the declarant's death were not relevant to the case
at bar, one court held that the declarant's tape recorded statements were not
admissible as dying declarations under Texas Rule of Evidence 804(b)(2).310
IX. ARTICLE IX-AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION
Texas Rule of Evidence 901 requires authentication or identification of
evidence as a condition precedent to admissibility. 311 The authentication re-
quirement is "satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what its proponent claims."1312 In Bundick v. Weller 313
the San Antonio court of appeals held that testimony sufficiently established
the chain of custody of a bullet jacket allegedly removed from the victim's
back to permit its introduction in a civil action for injuries resulting from a
shooting assault. 314 The court held that the witnesses' testimony regarding
the steps followed in recovery, examination, and custody of the bullet was a
sufficient predicate for admission.315
Texas Rule of Evidence 901(b) gives examples of authentication or identi-
fication conforming with the requirements of rule 901(a). Rule 901(b)(2)
provides that nonexpert opinion as to the genuineness of handwriting, based
upon familiarity not acquired for purposes of the litigation, is permissible
authentication. 316 Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(2) is identical to Texas
Rule of Evidence 901(b)(2). In InterFirst Bank v. Lull Manufacturing3 1 7 the
Fifth Circuit held that the signatures to promissory notes and security agree-
ments were properly authenticated by such nonexpert testimony. 318 Federal
Rule of Evidence 902(9) is identical to Texas Rule of Evidence 902(9), which
provides that commercial paper, signatures thereof, and documents relating
thereto are self-authenticating. 319 Because Texas's Uniform Commercial
Code provides that each signature on an instrument is admitted unless spe-
cifically denied in the pleadings, 320 the Lull court held that the commercial
paper in question was properly admitted when the pleadings contained no
308. Id. at 1336-37.
309. TEX. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
310. Thompson v. Mays, 707 S.W.2d 951, 957 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1986, no writ).
311. TEX. R. EvID. 901.
312. Id. 901(a).
313. 705 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ).
314. Id. at 780-81.
315. Id.
316. TEX. R. EviD. 901(b)(2).
317. 778 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1985).
318. Id. at 234.
319. TEX. R. EVID. 902(9).
320. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.307(a) (Vernon 1986).
1987]
468 SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41
such denial.321 In Ford Motor Co. v. Durril322 the Corpus Christi court of
appeals held that an exhibit submitted under a certificate signed by the Dep-
uty Director of the National Archives, which certificate stated that it was a
true and correct copy of a transcript by the Archives of a tape in its custody,
was properly authenticated under Texas Rule of Evidence 902(1), allowing
self-authentication of domestic public documents under seal. 323
X. ARTICLE X-CONTENTS OF WRITINGS, RECORDINGS,
AND PHOTOGRAPHS
Article X of the Texas Rules of Evidence governs the admission of the
contents of writings, recordings, and photographs. 324 Although the bulk of
this article codifies prior Texas law, the rules are much more liberal than
prior Texas practice in several respects.
Texas Rule of Evidence 1003 virtually eliminates the "best evidence"
rule.325 Rule 1003 permits the admission of a duplicate to the same extent as
an original unless a party raises a question of the authenticity of the original
or if it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original. 326 The
effect of this rule is that the "best evidence" rule will now apply primarily
only to oral testimony attempting to characterize or summarize matters con-
tained in writings, recordings, or photographs. In Centennial Bonding
Agency v. State327 a copy of a bond was admissible, under Texas Rule of
Evidence 1003, in a bond forfeiture proceeding because the authenticity of
the original was not placed in issue and the court found that the introduction
of the copy was not unfair to the surety.328 In Curran v. Unis329 photo-
copies of partnership income tax returns were admissible where the book-
keeper-custodian of the partnership's records and the comptroller-custodian
of the partnership testified that the photocopies appeared to be true and cor-
rect copies of the originals, which were submitted to the Internal Revenue
Service.330
Texas Rule of Evidence 1005 provides that the contents of an official rec-
ord, or of a document authorized to be recorded or filed, may be proven by a
certified copy or by testimony of a witness who has compared it with the
original, if the document is otherwise admissible.331 In Hickson v. Marti-
nez 332 the Dallas court of appeals held that the failure to admit a photocopy
of federal regulations concerning the mandatory standard of care at hospi-
321. 778 F.2d at 234.
322. 714 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
323. Id. at 339; see TEX. R. EvID. 902(1).
324. TEX. R. EVID. art. X.
325. Id. 1003.
326. Id.
327. 705 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
328. Id. at 868.
329. 711 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
330. Id. at 292-94.
331. TEX. R. EvID. 1005.
332. 707 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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tals receiving Medicare and Medicaid funds was improper.333 The court
concluded that when no objection about the photocopy's authenticity is
made, the photocopy must be admitted under Texas Rule of Evidence
1005. 334 Without mentioning the Texas Rules of Evidence the court in
Peery v. Peery335 held that the judge's own personal notes made during a
divorce hearing were not official records, were not part of the record, and
were not admissible.336
Texas Rule of Evidence 1006 provides that the contents of voluminous
writings, recordings, or photographs, otherwise admissible, which cannot be
conveniently examined in court, may be presented in the form of a chart or
summary.337 In State v. Buckner Construction Co., 338 a contract action
against the state, the court admitted into evidence a contractor's payroll
records, journals, ledgers, and summaries prepared from business records
regardless of whether the underlying invoices and checks were available for
examination. 339 Federal Rule of Evidence 1006 is identical to Texas Rule of
Evidence 1006. In Moore v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,34° a product liabil-
ity case brought against manufacturers of asbestos-containing products by
workers suffering from asbestosis, the product identification list that set out
various job sites at which each plaintiff worked, and the insulation with
which each plaintiff worked during his insulating career were admissible
under Federal Rule of Evidence 1006.34*1
XI. PAROL EVIDENCE
The parol evidence rule proscribes the use of extrinsic evidence to inter-
pret a writing in some circumstances. 342 A court may allow extrinsic evi-
dence only if it finds a contract to be ambiguous. 343 The rule also prohibits
parol evidence if a contract is integrated. 344
During the Survey period the appellate courts of Texas rejected attempts
to introduce parol evidence on varied and ingenious grounds. One Texas
court of appeals refused to allow parol evidence interpreting the extent of a
contractual exception in a contract between the city and the intervenor that
gave the intervenor exclusive hotel rights, subject to preexisting rights of an
333. Id. at 926.
334. Id.
335. 709 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
336. Id. at 395.
337. TEX. R. EvID. 1006.
338. 704 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
339. Id. at 843.
340. 781 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir. 1986).
341. Id. at 1066.
342. See 2 R. RAY, supra note 33, § 1601.
343. See Sun Oil Co. v. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726, 732 (Tex. 1981) (construction of unam-
biguous oil and gas lease).
344. Integration is the practice of embodying a transaction into a final written agreement




original lessee.345 Other courts refused to allow parol evidence of: (1) a
promise to provide a potential purchaser for resale of property, which prom-
ise was collateral to and not consideration for a promissory note that was
unambiguous as to the considerations therefor;3 46 (2) testimony attempting
to vary the terms in a contract of a condition subsequent that a fee would be
paid only if publication was accepted and funded;347 and (3) of the intent of
parties to a deed.348 In a payee's action on a promissory note against a cor-
porate maker, the parol evidence rule barred testimony that the payee agreed
to prepare the promissory note in the name of the corporate maker rather
than the actual maker, the corporation's president, and that the payee was to
extend notes beyond their due date.349 The payee, therefore, could not alter
the terms of the promissory note that the president signed in his individual
capacity.350 Absent allegations of deception, parol evidence was not admis-
sible in the suit on a guaranty agreement tO establish fraud in the
inducement.a51
During the Survey period the Texas Supreme Court considered the parol
evidence rule in Island Recreational Development Cora v. Republic of Texas
Savings Association.352 A developer and owner of a condominium brought
action against the bank for alleged breach of contract and for failure to fund
permanently the first mortgages of the condominium units in accordance
with the terms of a commitment letter. The evidence at trial showed that
prior to commencing construction and in order to arrange interim construc-
tion financing, Island Recreational executed an assignment of the letter of
commitment to Allied Merchants Bank. Island Recreational contended that
the assignment was merely a collateral assignment, as the record reflected
and as Republic's attorney conceded attrial. Evidence showed that Repub-
lic was fully aware at the time the commitment letter was issued that Island
Recreational would necessarily acquire interim construction financing, and
that it was customary in this type of transaction that the commitment of
long-term financing would be collaterally assigned to the lender of the con-
struction financing. The Texas Supreme Court held that an assignment,
though absolute in form, can be shown by parol evidence to be intended only
as collateral security.353
Several appellate courts during the Survey period admitted parol evidence
under varying circumstances. One court admitted parol evidence to deter-
345. Marriott Corp. v. Azar, 697 S.W.2d 60, 64 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
346. Albritton Dev. Co. v. Glendon Invs., Inc. 700 S.W.2d 244, 247 (Tex. App.-Houston
[lst Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
347. Rincones v. Windberg, 705 S.W.2d 846, 847-48 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, no writ).
348. Smith v. Graham, 705 S.W.2d 705, 706 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
349. Daniell Motor Co. v. Northwest Bank, 713 S.W.2d 808, 811-12 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1986, no writ).
350. Id.
351. Friday v. Grant Plaza Huntsville Assoc., 713 S.W.2d 755, 756-57 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).
352. 710 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1986).
353. Id. at 556.
[Vol. 41
EVIDENCE
mine the proper construction of a trust account in which an ambiguity arose
from a printed form.354 The ambiguity arose from the use of a printed form
normally used to create a joint savings account, but with handwritten addi-
tional terms indicating an intent to create a trust account. Another court
permitted parol evidence to define an agreement between a builder and
homeowners that the homeowners would do electrical work and that the
builder would furnish them the materials at his cost. 35 The court supported
its holding on the basis that no integrated agreement existed that covered the
entire transaction and that the furnishing of electrical equipment at cost was
a separate, distinct, collateral agreement to the contract. 356
Parol evidence was admissible to show mutual mistake of fact,3 5 7 and to
show fraud in the inducement. 358 Parol evidence was admissible to prove
the signature of an agent in his representative capacity, when the instrument
named the person represented but did not show that the person signed in a
representative capacity, 359 and also was admissible to show the insured's in-
tent when error was made in the name of the designated beneficiary under a
contract leading to a dispute as to the identity of the beneficiary. 36° Finally,
in a Deceptive Trade Practices Act 36' case, proof of oral representations by a
foundation repair company's agents was admissible to vary the terms of a
written contract. 362 The oral representations went to the quality of goods or
services and were admissible to show that the company committed false,
deceptive, or misleading practices in not performing the services that it
promised to do for the consumer.363
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